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compte cette immense crise de réfugiés, l’Inde et le Pakistan
furent déçus de réaliser que ce furent les impératifs politi-
ques de la guerre froide qui déterminèrent les résultats
finals pour ce qui est du contenu de la Convention et aussi
bien que du mandat du . Cinquante ans plus tard, ces
deux états n’ont toujours pas accédé à la Convention de
 relative au statut des réfugiés, préférant interagir avec
le  au cas par cas. L’article soutient que beaucoup des
raisons expliquant les hésitations de ces deux états envers le
 peuvent être retracées à leur compréhension initiale du
mandat du Haut Commissariat.
The states of South Asia
  have long had an ambiva-
lent relationship with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (). At times, this
has resulted in a remarkable partnership, as was the case in
 when India and  jointly provided relief to one
of the largest and most traumatic refugee movements in
contemporary history. At other times, however, the rela-
tionship has been fractious and hostile. This was the case
when  threatened to withdraw from Bangladesh in
 over the issue of forced repatriation, or when it did in
fact close its branch office in New Delhi for a period from
June , much to the displeasure of the Indian govern-
ment. The South Asian region has witnessed some of the
largest flows of forced migrants in recent history, and con-
tinues to host over  per cent of the world’s refugees. Cur-
rently,  plays a not inconsiderable role in the man-
agement of situations of forced displacement in South Asia.
It has assumed responsibility for “urban refugees” in India,
the largest caseload of such refugees recognized by the Of-
fice. In addition, it is providing varying levels of relief to
the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, Rohingya Muslim refu-
gees in Bangladesh, and Tamil s in Sri Lanka.
This article seeks to explore the origins of the relation-
ship between  and the states of South Asia. None of
Abstract
This paper traces the initial interaction of the states of
South Asia with the formalized international refugee
regime, as embodied within the Office of the . It
explores the debates surrounding the creation of the Office
and the  Refugee Convention, and attempts to analyze
the disillusionment felt by India and Pakistan with the
outcome of these deliberations. Both these states arrived at
the United Nations in this period with the burden of
hosting up to  million Partition refugees weighing heavily
on their inexperienced shoulders. Expecting that any
international regime created for the relief of refugees would
take into account this vast refugee crisis, India and Pakistan
were disappointed to realize that cold war politics largely
dictated the eventual outcome of the content of the Conven-
tion and the mandate of the . Fifty years later,
neither state has acceded to the  Refugee Convention,
preferring to interact with  on a strictly ad hoc basis.
This paper argues that many reasons for the hesitancy with
which these states approach  can be traced to their
initial understanding of the mandate of the Office.
Résumé
Cet article retrace l’interaction initiale des états de l’Asie du
sud avec un régime international de droits des réfugiés
formalisé, comme incorporé dans le Haut Commissariat. Il
explore les débats qui ont entouré la création de cette
institution ainsi que la Convention de  relative au
statut des réfugiés, et tente d’analyser les désenchantements
de l’Inde et du Pakistan avec les résultats de ces délibéra-
tions. Ces deux états sont arrivés aux Nations Unies pen-
dant cette période là, portant sur leurs épaules sans expé-
rience le lourd fardeau de l’hébergement de près de 
millions de réfugiés de la Partition. S’attendant à ce qu’un
régime international crée tout spécialement pour s’occuper
du bien-être des réfugiés prendrait tout naturellement en
36
these states has acceded to the  Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees, despite several attempts by 
over the years to promote accession. Yet, as will be seen
below, India and Pakistan were initially enthusiastic about
the creation of a formalized international refugee regime
as embodied in the Office of the .  Both countries
were in the midst of a vast refugee crisis while the issue was
being debated within the United Nations. By , an esti-
mated  million people had traversed the newly created
international border between the two states in search of
refuge from persecution, as religious particularism engulfed
the subcontinent. In such a situation, India and Pakistan
expected that this debate would address issues of immedi-
ate relevance to them. Yet by the time the debate reached
its final stages, both states had, in effect, withdrawn from
the deliberations. This article will trace the process whereby
India and Pakistan came to the conclusion that the for-
malized international refugee regime was largely inimical
to their interests. Given that sources for this facet of Indian
and Pakistani history are relatively limited, much of the
material included here is taken from the travaux prepara-
toires of the United Nations debates. In order to analyze
the policy attitude of South Asian states towards this issue,
however, it is first necessary to locate these states within an
emergent United Nations.
India
On August , , India became an independent member
of the international community, although its interaction
with international organizations preceded this date. It had
been a participant in the Versailles Conference of , and
had been represented in the League of Nations. Under the
first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, India looked to set
itself up as a major player on the international stage. In the
early years of independence, India’s policy of non-alignment
was well served within the United Nations, of which it was
a founding member. Despite its relative poverty and con-
sequent lack of international stature as determined by
material and positional power, the General Assembly gave
it a forum in which to articulate a robust, if idealistic, de-
fence of Third World solidarity and detachment from cold-
war power politics. It is, therefore, not surprising to find
that India was initially well represented in the debate on
the creation of a new international refugee regime. As the
first state to shed its colonial status in the aftermath of the
Second World War, India was in a position of leadership
among a group of countries that would eventually be
known as the Third World coalition. It was the first to raise
the question of racial discrimination in South Africa at the
United Nations and under Nehru was an early advocate of
nuclear non-proliferation. As the world debated issues of
human rights, as they pertained to the question of forced
migrants as well as other categories of persons, India was
drawing up its first constitution. This document was in-
spired to a great extent by the United Nations Charter, and
thus included provisions on respect for the human rights
of persons within the territory of India, and the promo-
tion of fundamental freedoms.  On September , ,
Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, India’s permanent representa-
tive to the United Nations, who was the first woman to be
elected president of the General Assembly in , stated,
“India has shown, in the shaping of its Constitution [that
the words of the  Charter] were no empty phrases, but a
living inspiration.”
Pakistan
Following the partition of British India, Pakistan emerged
on August , , as the new homeland for the Muslims
of the Indian subcontinent. Shortly after Pakistan was ad-
mitted to the United Nations, on September , , the
first prime minister of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah,
declared, “Pakistan will never be found wanting in extend-
ing its moral and material support to the oppressed . . . and
[in] upholding the principles of the United Nations Char-
ter.”  As was the case with its giant neighbour, in the early
years of its independent existence Pakistan was enthusias-
tic about the potential of the United Nations. As a rela-
tively weak state, it looked to harness the moral power of
that organization to renegotiate traditional power politics.
Along with championing the cause of anti-colonialism,
Pakistan played a leading role in the debate on the Pales-
tine issue and on the treatment of South African citizens
of Indian origin. During this period, the vexing issue of
relations with India, especially over the disputed territory
of Kashmir, brought Pakistan to the debating chambers and
dispute-settlement mechanisms of the United Nations
more than once. In the immediate period following India’s
referral of the Kashmir question to the Security Council
on January , , Pakistan argued vociferously for a plebi-
scite in the territory. A subsequent Security Council reso-
lution calling for a ceasefire and plebiscite was accordingly
considered a “vindication of [the Pakistan] stand by the
United Nations.”  As will be seen, and consequent to its
early positive view of the United Nations, Pakistan also
played an active role in the discussions and committees set
up to debate the international refugee regime.
So, in the aftermath of the Second World War, India and
Pakistan were among the first Afro-Asian colonial territories
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to win their independence. This enabled them to seize a
privileged position of leadership in the new and relatively
egalitarian General Assembly. As one author states, “many
of the issues which came up for consideration at the time
related to the right of self-determination and independ-
ence of peoples who were still struggling to be free, and
India and Pakistan, having been the most prominent suf-
ferers from imperialism, were regarded as the natural
spokesmen.”  Gradually, however, considerations of na-
tional interest tempered the unqualified enthusiasm with
which these states approached the United Nations within
this period. In the case of the Kashmir dispute in particu-
lar, India and Pakistan came to have widely divergent views
on the proper role of the United Nations within that con-
flict. However, on the question of refugee relief and reha-
bilitation, both countries displayed a remarkable conver-
gence of views. In a debate within the General Assembly’s
Ad Hoc Political Committee in December , accordingly,
the Pakistani representative declared,
after a series of conferences in connection with refugees, mil-
lions of Hindus had returned to Pakistan and millions of
Muslims had gone back to India, despite the fact that the two
countries had been waging an undeclared war for several
months. The Governments of Pakistan and India had never
thought it proper to link the question of settlement of the
refugee problem or their repatriation with any other issue
outstanding between them.
Partition Refugees
India and Pakistan came to these preliminary debates as
the Partition refugee crisis was reaching a breaking point.
By end of , over  million refugees had crossed the India–
West Pakistan border, in both directions, occasioning the
need for colossal relief and rehabilitation efforts.  Apart
from relatively minor contributions from foreign charita-
ble organizations, the two newly independent states shoul-
dered the entire responsibility for the refugees, which
ranged from provision of emergency transit camps, trans-
port, and supplies, to the construction of permanent hous-
ing colonies. An early indication of the extent of the inter-
national community’s interest in the refugee problem of
the subcontinent is provided by V. K. Krishna Menon, de-
fence minister under Nehru, who visited several countries
of Europe in  as a personal representative of the In-
dian Ministry for External Affairs. By August , follow-
ing a call for “direct action” by the Muslim League, riots
had broken out in several districts of British India, leading
to a near collapse of the civil administration, and the mass
displacement of several thousands. It was in the context of
this situation of near anarchy and the beginnings of an
unprecedented movement of peoples, that Menon stated,
“the outstanding and overall impression left on my mind . . .
are . . . the very limited reference to our internal problems
and difficulties.”  The Indian subcontinent was thus given
early indication of the marginal impact its refugee crisis
was to have on the world community. However, both states
would continue to take active part in the United Nations
debate on the international refugee regime, in keeping with
their early enthusiasm for the goals of that organization.
Refugees and the Post-War International
Community
The issue of refugee protection was, by the end of the Sec-
ond World War, of some concern to the international com-
munity. This concern was mainly focused on European
refugees, the majority of whom had been created by war
hostilities, but increasingly included persons fleeing Com-
munist bloc states. In the immediate aftermath of the war,
the lead refugee agency was the International Refugee Or-
ganization (). This organization had come into exist-
ence in place of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refu-
gees and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Ad-
ministration () in July . Mandated to operate
for a limited period of time, the  nevertheless “treated
the refugee problem in totality.” In other words, it was re-
sponsible for issues of legal protection and relief, and of
resettlement of refugees not just in Europe, but those who
had fled to countries such as India and to the Middle East.
By the late s, however, it became apparent that the ques-
tion of refugees, even just that of European refugees, was
no closer to a permanent solution. On July , , the 
General Council adopted Resolution , which provided
for termination of the organization’s activities. Conse-
quently, it gradually reduced its operations, and was finally
wound up in early .
So, by , the question of refugees and stateless per-
sons was being debated within the United Nations. During
these discussions, the issue was divided into the following:
provisions for the functioning of a High Commissioner’s
Office for Refugees; definition of the term refugee; prob-
lems of assistance to refugees and institution of a draft
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. At the fourth
session of the General Assembly, on December , , a
decision was made to accept in principle the establishment
of a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on
January , , the date that the  was expected to dis-
solve. This was followed by a request to the Economic and
Social Council () to establish the details of a statute
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for the new agency. In  the General Assembly decided
to convene a Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Geneva,
which was intended to complete the drafting and signing
the Refugee Convention.
The Role of India and Pakistan
As has been noted, India and Pakistan were active players
in the initial discussions on blueprints for a new interna-
tional refugee regime. In November , at the seventy-
ninth meeting of the Third Committee, India submitted a
draft resolution “with a view to conciliating the various
points of view expressed in the previous Resolutions,” in
which it stated its position that “the main task concerning
displaced persons is to encourage and assist in every possi-
ble way their early return to their countries of origin.”  At
a subsequent meeting, the committee set up a drafting sub-
committee of thirteen members, which included a repre-
sentative of India, and which took as the basis for discus-
sions a new draft resolution prepared by India. Both India
and Pakistan at the outset declared their sympathy with
the aims of this new refugee regime. Consequently, on Au-
gust , , the Indian representative at the Economic and
Social Council declared that India was “fully prepared to
co-operate in the drafting of Conventions for the legal pro-
tection of refugees, provided they were consistent with its
own national citizenship laws, which were at the moment
in the process of being framed.”
United Nations Debate: The Refugee Definition
As the discussion on the future form and scope of a new
refugee organization gathered momentum in the United
Nations, one major point of debate was the definition of a
refugee to be applied within the new regime. The discus-
sion was essentially divided between states that favoured a
broader definition than that contained within the iro con-
stitution (spearheaded by the United Kingdom, and sup-
ported by India and Pakistan), and others who were op-
posed to extending the iro definition (led by the United
States delegation).  Broadly speaking, the majority of rep-
resentatives of the emerging “Third World” contested the
application of temporal and spatial limitations. These states
made it clear that they considered it the duty of the United
Nations, if the claims that it was a truly egalitarian organi-
zation were to be justified, to substantially extend its un-
derstanding of “a refugee.”
Yet, the United States, wary of asking the United Na-
tions to “sign a blank cheque,” argued for a refugee defini-
tion that was consonant with the iro constitution. This
would mean in effect that the jurisdiction of the High Com-
missioner’s Office would extend only as far as persons in
Europe who had become refugees as a result of the Second
World War. These refugees, according to some delegations,
were the reason that the issue of forced migrants had been
placed on the agenda of the General Assembly in the first
place. To extend the scope of these discussions beyond such
defined limits would leave the United Nations liable to “as-
sume responsibilities too readily.”  As Eleanor Roosevelt
stated, “The Pakistan representative had in fact suggested
that the General Assembly accept responsibility for all cat-
egories of refugees existing in any part of the world, and
also for such other categories as might develop in the fu-
ture.”  Opposition to this view was led by the delegation
of the United Kingdom, which argued, in common with
the states of the subcontinent, that a regime centred on the
United Nations should provide minimum guarantees for
all refugees, irrespective of their origins.
While the debate sought to define the status of persons
who might need protection in the future, India and Paki-
stan attempted to call attention to the millions of refugees
on their territory at that time. As mentioned previously,
the two new states were struggling with the burden of car-
ing for a vast refugee population. This was complicated by
the exigencies of nation building faced by the relatively
impoverished states. Both delegations accordingly at-
tempted repeatedly to assert that the Partition refugees
deserved protection within the new international refugee
regime. The Pakistani representative thus claimed that
after the end of [the Second World War] . . . other events had
taken place in other parts of the world. If the United Nations
was to be entrusted with the problem [of refugees], it should
consider it on a worldwide basis. For example, a year and a
half earlier, Pakistan had been compelled to receive from  to
 million refugees coming from various part of India.
In addition, the Indian delegate argued,
it had to cope with its own refugee problem—indeed there
were  million Indian refugees who had to be looked after
and resettled. He hoped the United Nations would acknowl-
edge that India was performing an international as well as a
national duty by helping those people . . . 
Other delegations claimed, however, that the situation
facing the Indian subcontinent was that of internal refugee
flight, since in both cases the refugee groups did not lack
the protection of a government. Consequently, in their
opinion, since there was no need for the legal protection of
these refugees, this was not a matter with which these de-
liberations were concerned.  Yet in addition to India and
Pakistan, other delegations argued for the inclusion within
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the new regime of groups of refugees that would be ex-
cluded if the proposed limitations of time and space were
applied. Thus, several Middle Eastern countries argued for
the inclusion in the regime of the Palestinian refugees,
and the Greek delegate urged consideration of the approxi-
mately , Greeks who had been forced to seek refuge
as a result of the civil war.
United Nations Debate: Legal protection vs.
Material Assistance
Another major debate within these discussions, and related
to the plea of the Indian and Pakistani delegates to include
consideration of those displaced at Partition, was on the
proposed need to distinguish between international legal
protection and material assistance for refugees. Contend-
ing that the greatest need of refugees bereft of the protec-
tion of a state was the legal assistance of the international
community, some states challenged the notion that the
proposed Office of the High Commissioner should be re-
sponsible for the provision of material aid to refugees. While
India and Pakistan agreed that the legal protection of refu-
gees was in many ways the cornerstone of the international
refugee regime, they argued from their perspective that the
guarantee of legal rights without concomitant material as-
sistance was a hollow concept. The Indian representative,
Mrs. Kripalani, consequently asserted that “it was true that
[the Partition] refugees were not stateless; the State ensured
their protection. But statelessness was often a lesser hard-
ship than lack of food, clothing, shelter and work.” The
Pakistani representative added in agreement that “although
statelessness was a great privation, it was after all the least
of the misfortunes to deal with which the iro had been set
up.”
However, the strategic marginality of the Indian sub-
continent and the scale of the problem with which it was
confronted, made it difficult to gain a sympathetic ear
among powerful states. In a private conversation, Phillip
Burnett, a member of the American  delegation, ex-
plained to Mr. Bokhari, spokesperson of the Pakistani del-
egation, that the extension of material aid to the Partition
refugees under the mandate of the High Commissioner’s
Office “would not be regarded favourably by the U.S. since
the problem was so enormous.” Yet India and Pakistan,
making their debut on the world stage as independent
states, looked to the United Nations to represent the post-
war international community in its entirety. The recently
adopted Universal Declaration for Human Rights appeared
to them to make this a pressing duty. In addition, the mas-
sive burden of the Partition refugees made them loath to
accept a partial regime, in which their own concerns were
sidelined, if not neglected.
The financial implications of providing emergency re-
lief to millions of Partition refugees meant that, by ,
India and Pakistan were no longer able to continue mate-
rial contributions to the iro. As discussion in the United
Nations centred on the future of the iro, the issue of ex-
penses was one that both states, along with other non-
European developing countries, viewed with some justi-
fied alarm. Indian and Pakistani representatives argued
against having to shoulder the burden of iro refugees, con-
sidering instead that this organization was well able to com-
plete its task before being dissolved. Several commentators
have noted that one of the pressing reasons for the refor-
mulation of the post-war international refugee regime was
the need to create secure conditions in order that Europe
might share the burden of its refugees with other parts of
the world.  Some European states, such as France, believed
that it was time for all members of the United Nations to
contribute to the resettlement of the remaining war refu-
gees, as well as the growing influx of refugees from the East-
ern bloc. Yet, in the context of their own refugee and eco-
nomic problems, India and Pakistan considered unfair the
notion that they should be expected to support European
refugees, especially when they were not expected to gain
any reciprocal benefit for the refugees on their own territory.
By November , , the joint draft resolution on the
establishment of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees was ready to be put to a vote
in the Third Committee. Following strong statements in
opposition to the proposed Office,  India and Pakistan
voted against the resolution. On December , , India
abstained from and Pakistan voted against General Assem-
bly Resolution  (), which established the Office of
, and which was eventually passed by thirty-five votes
to seven, with thirteen abstentions.
Debate on the Refugee Definition Continues
By , debate in the United Nations was centred on de-
fining the scope and nature of a Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees as well as a statute for the High Com-
missioner’s Office. Pakistan continued to oppose the limi-
tations being placed on the refugee definition. In the elev-
enth session of , the Pakistani delegate stated that
“his Government could not accept the definition of the term
‘refugee’ as given in the draft Convention. That definition
covered European refugees only, and completely ignored
refugees from other parts of the world.”  In the Third Com-
mittee of the General Assembly, Belgium, Canada, Turkey,
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and the United Kingdom presented a joint amendment to
the draft statute, which attempted to broaden the defini-
tion of persons falling under the competence of the High
Commissioner’s Office. In removing the limitations in time
and space, this amendment and others submitted by such
states as Egypt, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia recognized, in
the words of the Chilean delegate, that “it was the duty of
the United Nations to extend international protection to
every person who, for reasons beyond his control, could
no longer live in the country of his birth.”
However, this was opposed by the United States and
France, which continued to favour a more limited “defini-
tion by categories” that would specify the particular groups
to be covered. They argued that the limited definition they
were promoting included all refugee groups “who were in
need of international protection,” and also that it was in-
appropriate at this stage to make decisions concerning fu-
ture groups of refugees.  By this stage, India appears to
have decided that the proposed regime was in many ways a
creature of the Western world, and was therefore attempt-
ing to ensure a minimal obligatory engagement with the
regime. In August , accordingly, the Indian delegate
noted, “the Indian delegation had opposed the broad defi-
nition of the term ‘refugee’ . . . because the broad defini-
tion would make a satisfactory solution of certain prob-
lems connected with refugees less probable inasmuch as it
would not be possible to determine in advance exactly what
categories of refugees would be covered by it.”  Shortly
thereafter, in a comment on the report of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Statelessness and Related Problems, India, in the
light of its “most difficult problem of rehabilitating a very
large number of refugees from Pakistan,” declared its in-
ability to host any European refugees. It asserted that the
treatment of any “European refugees” would therefore con-
tinue to be governed by the same laws as were applicable to
foreigners in general.
India and Pakistan Disillusioned
Following their disappointment at the debate in the Third
Committee the previous year, both India and Pakistan had
largely abstained from the above discussions. However, the
Indian delegate spoke briefly at the Third Committee de-
bate in December , in order to clarify the position of
her country, and it is worth quoting at some length from
that statement in order to get a sense of the attitude of In-
dia (which was largely shared by Pakistan) towards the
ongoing debate. She stated,
the United Nations should try to help not only special sec-
tions of the world’s population, but all afflicted people every-
where. Suffering knew no racial or political boundaries; it was
the same for all. As international tension increased, vast masses
of humanity might be uprooted and displaced. For the United
Nations to attempt a partial remedy involving discrimination,
whether accidental or deliberate, would be contrary to the
great principles of the Charter . . . The Indian delegation had
[previously] been in favour of a limited definition [of the term
refugee] because it was fully and painfully conscious of the
limitations of the whole project that was being considered.
Rather than become a party to such an unreal attempt, the
Indian delegation had preferred to abstain from voting.
At the nd meeting of the Third Committee, delegates
voted on a revised joint compromise text on the refugee
definition to be applied within the statute of the High Com-
missioner’s Office and in the draft Convention. Following
a suggestion of the U.K. delegate, two draft definitions were
agreed upon. Although still too restrictive for many del-
egations, including the U.K. and the states of the Indian
subcontinent, these definitions were considered a triumph
of the “universal definition.” Yet, as Hathaway notes, “the
eurocentric goal . . . was achieved by limiting the scope of
mandatory international protection under the Convention
to refugees whose flight was prompted by a pre- event
within Europe.”
Another suggestion of the United Kingdom delegation
was that a Conference of Plenipotentiaries from interested
states should be convened in Geneva in  in order to
devise a final draft of the Convention. It was accordingly
decided that a special conference should be held, which
would operate outside the parameters of the United Na-
tions; this would enable non-members of that organiza-
tion, which had a special interest in the issue of refugees, to
participate. Consequently, states such as West Germany,
Italy, and Austria, which had substantial refugee populations
on their territory, and Switzerland and the Vatican, who
had historically been concerned with the problem of refu-
gee flight, were invited to the conference. On June , ,
Pakistan provided a brief comment to the conference on
article  of the draft Convention, which dealt with the
freedom of movement of refugees. Nevertheless, neither
India nor Pakistan played any substantial part, nor was ei-
ther officially represented, in the conference. During a sub-
sequent vote of appreciation, proposed by the United States
in August , for the work of the iro, both India and Pa-
kistan mentioned again their particular experience of refu-
gee movement. However, it is impossible to know if this
was a deliberate attempt to remind the international com-
munity of the traumatic events with which they had re-
cently dealt, on their own.
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Conclusions
As noted above, nearly fifty years later, neither India nor
Pakistan, nor indeed any other state in the Indian subconti-
nent, has signed the  Refugee Convention. This refusal to
accede to the Convention originated in the opinion that
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was
an instrument of the cold war, and consequently not rel-
evant to the situation of the Indian subcontinent within
the international system. Such an opinion is not entirely
misplaced. Gordenker claims that “the United Nations
Convention for Refugees emerged from the American-led
policy process of the United Nations.”  The growing ideo-
logical divide between the East and the West convinced the
United States that the reconstruction of Europe was its most
pressing priority. Consequently, despite the fact that it had
earlier been the main financial contributor to the iro and
, it was not willing to commit funds to an organiza-
tion that dealt with the refugee problems of states largely
marginal to its strategic aims. Inevitably, therefore, the
United States “more or less ignored” the massive move-
ment of Partition refugees because of the negligible politi-
cal impact of the subcontinent on a bipolar world. How-
ever, on the other hand, it was politically expedient to maxi-
mize the international visibility of the migration of politi-
cal refugees from the Soviet bloc. Hence the American sup-
port for a “temporary refugee agency with a narrow au-
thority and limited function . . . and a restricted definition
of refugees within the Convention.” The clear pro-West-
ern orientation of the emerging refugee regime ensured
that Yugoslavia, a state beginning to chart its own inde-
pendent course in world politics, was the only Communist
country represented in the Conference of Plenipotentiar-
ies.
India and Pakistan came away from the negotiations
surrounding the birth of the post-war international refu-
gee regime with mixed feelings. Although they agreed with
the need to set up a legal framework of refugee protection,
they were acutely disappointed that this regime was not
prepared to recognize the tremendous refugee burden un-
der which they laboured, and to recognize that non-
European refugee movements must also be of concern to
the international community. In the early s India pub-
licly took the view that, since it had no direct concern with
the refugee issue as it was defined within the United Na-
tions Convention, India did not wish to compromise its
neutral status by getting involved. In , the permanent
representative of India to the  discussed India’s attitude
towards the international refugee regime with the High
Commissioner for Refugees, and promised to direct the
Ministry of External Affairs to re-examine the issue. Mr.
Aamir Ali,  representative for the Far East, visited
India later that year to discuss the question of the 
with the government of India. In a meeting with the for-
eign secretary, Mr. R. K. Nehru, he was told that “you [the
] help refugees from the so-called non-free world
into the free world. We do not recognise such a division of
the world.”  Similarly, in meetings with the Pakistani
deputy secretary for  Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, in April , Ali was informed of Pakistan’s desire
to propose an amendment to the  statute. However,
as Ali noted, the deputy secretary “was very resentful of
. He said that the Pakistani delegation had been en-
couraged by various  officials to broach the ques-
tion of an amendment, but when the delegation had dis-
cussed such a move with other delegations it had run into
a brick wall of opposition.”  The disillusionment of the
two South Asian states with the realpolitik of an ostensibly
non-political refugee regime is evident.
Even in the aftermath of the  Protocol, which re-
moved the temporal and spatial limitations of the 
Convention, both states have preferred to conduct ad hoc
agreements with the  rather than accede to the Con-
vention.  has periodically urged the states of South
Asia to reconsider their decision on accession. However,
these states continue to view the Convention and Protocol
as irrelevant to the refugee experience of South Asia. Offi-
cially, South Asian governments maintain that their reluc-
tance to accede to the Convention stems from the fact that
it does not cater to situations of mass influx or to mixed
flows of migrants, both of which characterize forced popu-
lation flows in this region. In addition, they claim that the
Convention represents an imbalance between the rights and
obligations of source and receiving countries, and that the
principle of international burden sharing is inadequately
institutionalized within the regime. It is important, how-
ever, that some commentators further locate this hesita-
tion in the desire of the states of the Indian subcontinent
to retain a significant degree of autonomy in their refugee
policies. Few institutional mechanisms have been created
for the protection of refugees by governments in this re-
gion in the last fifty years—a fact that has led to criticism
of South Asian refugee policy as ad hoc, arbitrary, and even
biased towards particular refugee groups. Yet, the states of
South Asia maintain, with some measure of credibility, that
they have respected the “spirit if not the letter” of the 
Convention and  Protocol. Noting recent attempts by
some Western governments to modify, or even negate, both
the spirit and the letter of these instruments, states such
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as India and Pakistan have lately re-emphasised their op-
position to accession. This policy stance can be seen, in
many ways, as a legacy of the frustrating deliberations that
took place in the United Nations between  and .
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